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Introduction
In England and Wales, rates of methicillin-resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus (MRSA) bacteraemia in hospitals showed a sharp 
decline following implementation of the national CleanYour-
Hands campaign in 2004, with rates falling from 1.9 to 0.9 cases 
per 10 000 bed days between 2004 and 20081. Over the same period, 
the methicillin-sensitive Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) bacterae-
mia rate showed a small increase from 2.7 per 10 000 bed days in 
2004 to 3.0 in 2008. Analysis of regional or hospital-level data 
from England reveals a similar picture: most hospital settings 
experienced sharp falls in rates of MRSA infection from 2004, 
while MSSA infection rates either did not fall or fell only in 
line with preexisting trends2,3. A remarkably similar pattern has 
recently been reported for Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) 
in England4. CDI prevention policies, including infection con-
trol and antibiotic stewardship, were introduced in England in 
2007; by 2013 the annual number of CDI had fallen by approxi-
mately 80 per cent. Genomic analysis revealed that this decline 
was accounted for by the elimination of fluoroquinolone-resistant 
strains. Rates of infection with fluoroquinolone-sensitive strains 
showed very little change following the interventions, and there 
was no change in the number of inferred secondary cases with or 
without hospital contact.
These diverging outcomes for antibiotic-resistant and antibiotic-
sensitive variants of common nosocomial pathogens have led 
some researchers to argue that these data provide evidence against 
infection control measures having played a major role in these 
declines3,4. It is reasoned that non-specific infection control meas-
ures, such as improved hand hygiene or ward cleaning, would be 
expected to reduce hospital transmission of resistant and sensitive 
strains equally. The fact that we observe only declines in resist-
ant strains indicates that other factors, i.e. those having a differ-
ential effect on resistant and sensitive strains, must have been the 
major causes for the reduction4. Here we develop a simple mecha-
nistic mathematical model to assess the validity of this line of 
reasoning. Our model considers the carriage dynamics of two bac-
terial strains: one antibiotic-resistant and one antibiotic-sensitive. 
We assume that both strains are able to spread between individu-
als in the hospital and the community, but that the resistant strain 
transmits better in the hospital, while the sensitive strain transmits 
better in the community.
Since most bacterial hospital pathogens of clinical concern can 
be carried asymptomatically over long periods, we account for 
movements of colonized individuals between the hospital and 
community5. We explicitly model a hospital hand hygiene interven-
tion and evaluate the impact of this intervention on the incidence 
of hospital and community acquisitions of antibiotic-resistant and 
antibiotic-sensitive strains.
Methods
Model framework and assumptions
We developed a dynamic deterministic compartmental transmission 
model to track the number of people colonized with the resistant 
and sensitive strains in the hospital and community (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Flow diagram of model framework. In all three populations, individuals can reside in and move between the three carriage states 
(uncolonized, colonized with antibiotic-sensitive bacteria, and colonized with antibiotic-resistant bacteria). Movements between states are 
indicated by black arrows. Broken white lines indicate what variables influence transition rates between compartments. Transmission events 
between hospitalized patients are mediated by transiently contaminated healthcare workers (circles), and transient contamination is removed 
by hand hygiene events (an intervention which affects resistant and sensitive strains equally).
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Transmission between patients in the hospital was assumed to 
occur via the transiently contaminated hands of healthcare workers. 
We modelled this process explicitly using a previously described 
host-vector approach6,7. Healthcare workers in turn were assumed 
to become transiently contaminated through patient contact. Hand 
hygiene performed by a contaminated healthcare worker was 
assumed to clear this contamination8. Individuals were assumed 
to be either colonized with an antibiotic-sensitive strain (whether 
asymptomatically or symptomatically), colonized with an antibiotic- 
resistant strain or uncolonized and susceptible to both.
Patients were tracked by their hospitalisation history so that 
recently discharged patients (those in population 2) experienced 
a transient period with a shorter expected time to their next hos-
pital admission; i.e. a higher (re)admission rate than the general 
community population (population 3, Figure 1). The model 
allowed for the possibility of assortative mixing within popu-
lations 2 and 3. The resistant strain was assumed to be better 
adapted to the hospital setting, meaning that in the absence of 
other colonized hosts, a patient colonized with a resistant strain 
admitted to the hospital would be expected to generate more sec-
ondary cases during their hospital episode than a patient colonized 
with a sensitive strain. In contrast, the sensitive strain was assumed 
to be better adapted to the community. Individuals could not be 
co-infected with resistant and sensitive strains, and we allowed for 
bacterial interference between the two strains so that colonization 
with one strain reduced the risk of acquisition of the other strain9.
Model equations are given below. Variables are defined in Table 1 
and parameter definitions and values in Table 2.
Table 1. Model variables.
Variable Description
U1
Susceptible population 1: number of patients in hospital who are not 
colonized/infected with either the resistant or sensitive strain.
U2
Susceptible population 2: number of individuals in community setting 
who have a short expected time to hospital admission who are 
colonized with neither the resistant nor the sensitive strain.
U3
Susceptible population 3: number of individuals in community setting 
who have a long expected time to hospital admission who are 
colonized with neither the resistant nor the sensitive strain
R1
Resistant population 1: number of patients in hospital setting 
colonized with the resistant (hospital-adapted) strain
R2
Resistant population 2: number of individuals in community setting 
colonized with the resistant (hospital-adapted) strain who have a 
short expected time to hospital admission
R3
Resistant population 3: number of individuals in community setting 
colonized with the resistant (hospital-adapted) strain who have a 
long expected time to hospital admission
S1
Sensitive population 1: number of patients in hospital setting 
colonized with the sensitive (community-adapted) strain
S2
Sensitive population 2: number of patients in hospital setting 
colonized with the sensitive (community-adapted) strain who have a 
short expected time to hospital admission
S3
Sensitive population 3: number of patients in hospital setting 
colonized with the sensitive (community-adapted) strain who have a 
long expected time to hospital admission
hcwR
Number of hospital healthcare workers who are transiently colonized 
with the resistant (hospital-adapted) strain
hcwS
Number of hospital healthcare workers who are transiently colonized 
with the sensitive (community-adapted) strain
Page 4 of 30
Wellcome Open Research 2017, 2:16 Last updated: 22 NOV 2017
Table 2. Model parameters. *Defined by other parameters to give R0 a value of 1.5 for the resistant strain 
and a value of 1.4 for the sensitive strain. Here, R0 is defined as the expected number of secondary cases 
in the hospital and community resulting from one infected individual in a fully uncolonized and susceptible 
population, with a baseline hand hygiene rate of 40% and accounting for the possibility of readmissions while 
still colonized.
Parameter Description Value (range)
N1 Number of hospitalised patients 1000
Nhcw Number of healthcare workers (HCW) 100
N2
Number of people in the community who have a short expected time to 
hospital admission (recently discharged people) 10,000
N3
Number of people in the community who have a long expected time to 
hospital admission (not recently discharged people) 100,000
τ Hospital patient removal rate (reciprocal of mean hospital stay) 10d–1
ν
Rate of transition from the community population with a high hospital 
admission rate to the community population with a low hospital 
admission rate
hN3/N2
ρ Ratio of hospital admission rate of the recently hospitalised to hospital admission rate for the general population 20
h Admission rate to hospital of people in the general population See methods
r Admission rate to hospital of recently discharged people See methods
c Mean number of HCW contacts per patient day 10
γR1,γR2,γR3
Carriage clearance rate of the resistant (hospital-adapted) strain in the 
hospital/community (reciprocal of mean carriage duration) 400d
–1
γS1,γS2,γS3 As above for the sensitive (community-adapted) strain 40d
–1,400d–1,400d–1
βR1
Transmission parameter for the resistant strain (from colonized HCW to 
a susceptible patient)* 0.187 (0.035, 0.225)
βS1 As above for the sensitive strain* 0.100 (0.040, 0.216)
p
Ratio of probability of transmission from colonized patient to a 
susceptible HCW to the probability of transmission from colonized 
HCW to a susceptible patient
10
βR2,βR3








Rate at which uncolonized individuals become infected with the 
resistant strain per unit time in the hospital/community See methods
λS1,λS2,λS3 As above for the sensitive strain See methods
H Baseline hand hygiene compliance (probability of successful hand decontamination following patient contact) 40%
η Hand hygiene rate See methods
ωR
Bacterial interference: risk ratio for acquiring the resistant strain if 
carrying the sensitive strain relative to a non-carrier 0
ωS As above for the sensitive strain 0
f23
Fraction of N2 individuals that mixes with N3 (where 1 assumes 
homogeneous mixing) N2/N3
f32
Fraction of N3 individuals that mixes with N2 (where 1 assumes 
homogeneous mixing) 1
-
Percentage of transmission events with the hospital-adapted strain 
(assuming an otherwise fully susceptible population, and that the 
hospital-adapted strain is initially acquired in the hospital)
25%
- As above for the community-adapted strain 2.5
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Equations
    
1dU
dt
 = rU2 + hU3 – τU1 – λR1U1 – λS1U1 + γR1R1 + γS1S1            (1)
    
2dU
dt
 = –rU2 – νU2 + τU1 – λR2U2 – λS2U2 + γR2R2 + γS2S2          (2)
   
3dU
dt
 = –hU3 + νU2 – λR3U3 – λS3U3 + γR3R3 + γS3S3                   (3)
    
1dR
dt
 = rR2 + hR3 – τR1 – γR1R1 + λR1U1 + ωRλR1S1 – ωSλS1R1      (4)
    
2dR
dt
 = –rR2 – νR2 + τR1 – γR2R2 + λR2U2 + ωRλR2S2 – ωSλS2R2    (5)
    
3dR
dt
 = –hR3 + vR2 – γR3R3 + λR3U3 + ωRλR3S3 – ωSλS3R3                 (6)
    
1dS
dt
 = rS2 + hS3 – τS1 – γS1S1 + λS1U1 + ωSλS1R1 – ωRλR1S1       (7)
     
2dS
dt
 = –rS2 – νS2 + τS1 – γS2S2 + λS2U2 + ωSλS2R2 – ωRλR2S2   (8)
     
3dS
dt








 = βS1S1(Nhcw – hcwR – hcwS)/Nhcw – ηhcwS                      (11)
h = τN1 ⁄(N3 + ρN2)
r = ρh
λR1 = βR1 hcwR ⁄Nhcw
λR2 = βR2R2⁄N2 + βR3R3 f23 ⁄N2
λR3 = βR3R3 ⁄N3 + βR2R2 f32 ⁄N3
λS1 = βS1hcwS ⁄Nhcw
λS2 = βS2S2 ⁄N2 + βS3S3 f23 ⁄N2
λS3 = βS3S3 ⁄N3 + βS2S2 f32 ⁄N3
η = HcN1 ⁄ (NHCW(1 – H))
N1 = U1 + R1 + S1
N2 = U2 + R2 + S2
N3 = U3 + R3 + S3
The basic reproduction numbers for both resistant and sensi-
tive pathogens (1.5 and 1.4, respectively) were calculated as the 
dominant eigenvalues of the next generation matrix10. Here, R0 is 
defined as the expected number of secondary cases in the hospital 
and community resulting from one infected individual in a fully 
uncolonized and susceptible population at baseline hand hygiene 
rates of 40%, accounting for the possibility of readmissions while 
still colonized. The model was implemented by numerically solv-
ing the set of ordinary differential equations using R version 3.3.1 
(Team R Development Core, website: https://cran.r-project.org/) 
and the package deSolve11. Model code is available online at  https://
zenodo.org/record/345136#.WLmdTVWLTcv20.
Hospital infection control measures
We modelled a hospital infection control intervention to reduce 
secondary spread of bacterial pathogens in the hospital. This 
was achieved by a stepwise increase in hand hygiene compliance 
amongst health care workers from a baseline rate of 40% to a rate of 
50%. We assumed the intervention was equally effective at decon-
taminating hands of healthcare workers transiently contaminated 
with resistant and sensitive strains.
Measuring the impact of hospital infection control
Annual incidence rate ratios (IRR) were calculated using simulated 
data for one year pre- and post-intervention after first running the 
model to equilibrium. These correspond to the ratio of the number of 
new infections in the year pre-intervention to the number in the first 
year post-intervention. To aid comparison with reported infection 
data4, we assumed the number of new infections with and without a 
hospital link was proportional to the cumulative number of acquisi-
tions in the hospital and community, respectively, in each of the 
two time periods. Confidence intervals were calculated using 1000 
Monte Carlo replicates on the assumption that the actual number of 
observed infections of each strain (Yi) followed a negative binomial 
distribution with Var(Yi) = µ + µ2/κ, with κ (the dispersion parame-
ter) = µ/(θ − 1) where θ = 5, and assuming 1 in 10 carriage episodes 
resulted in an infection.
Investigating the importance of environmental adaptation 
of competing pathogens
At baseline, the relative fraction of new cases acquired in hos-
pital was 25% and 2.5% for the resistant and sensitive strains, 
respectively. To investigate the impact of hospital- and community-
adaptation of both strains on our findings, we varied the level of 
transmission in both settings for each of the two strains, while keep-
ing the overall basic reproduction number for resistant and sensi-
tive strains constant at 1.5 and 1.4, respectively. We investigated 
hospital acquisition fractions of 0.5–60%, for the resistant strain, 
and 0.5–15% for the sensitive strain. Only scenarios where resistant 
and sensitive strains co-existed prior to the intervention were con-
sidered in this analysis, and we considered this to be the case when 
the equilibrium incidence rates for colonization were above one per 
100,000 person years for both strains.
Results
Impact of hospital infection control
Improving hand hygiene compliance by 10% resulted in dramatic 
reductions in the incidence of infections with the resistant strain. 
These reductions were most pronounced for secondary cases that 
resulted from cross-infection within the hospital (IRR = 0.41 [95% 
CI: 0.32–0.52] under baseline parameters); they were also clearly 
observed for acquisitions that occurred in the community (IRR = 
0.67 [0.59–0.76], Figure 2). Incidence rates of infections caused 
by the sensitive strain were markedly less affected by the interven-
tion, though in the first year post-intervention there was a moder-
ate reduction in infections linked to hospital transmission (IRR = 
0.83 [0.55–1.22] Figure 2). In contrast, the reduced competition 
from the resistant strain resulted in moderate increases in 
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Figure 2. Distribution of predicted incidence rate ratios associated with the infection control intervention. Predicted annual incidence 
rate ratios (IRRs) for infections with the resistant and sensitive bacterial strains associated with a 10% improvement in hand hygiene compliance 
from a baseline of 40%. Incidence rate ratios were calculated using simulated data one year pre- and post-intervention, where observed 
infections followed a negative binomial distribution with a mean proportional to the number of acquisitions in hospital and community in the 
deterministic model. Shaded areas represent distributions, and enclosed dots and lines represent medians and standard deviations. An IRR 
of 1 corresponds to no change (dotted line). Non-enclosed single dots and lines represent mean and 95% confidence intervals of observed 
IRRs for C. difficile fluoroquinolone-resistant (turquoise) and fluoroquinolone-sensitive (grey) strains, grouped according to presence or 
absence of a hospital link (data from 4).
sensitive infections linked to community acquisitions (IRR = 
1.10 [1.03–1.17], Figure 2). The net result was a small overall 
increase in the incidence of infections with the sensitive pathogen. 
These trends are exactly in line with reported data4 (Figure 2).
Dynamics after hospital infection control
The above results appear counterintuitive, but can be understood 
after consideration of the dynamics. First, the reduction in resist-
ant infections linked to community transmission can be explained 
by a reduction in the number of patients colonized with resist-
ant bacteria at hospital discharge. Reducing the efflux of these 
colonized patients into the community (a consequence of reduced 
transmission in the hospital) leads to a long-term decline in the 
prevalence and incidence of the resistant strain in this setting 
(Figure 3). These gradual changes in the community reser-
voir (which occur despite the sudden changes in the hospital 
transmission rate due to the intervention) in turn lead to reduced 
importations (and subsequent transmission) of the resistant 
strain into the hospital. This explains why we see a gradual 
decline in resistant infections in the hospital and community, even 
following an intervention that occurs in a stepwise manner and 
which is restricted to the hospital.
For the sensitive pathogen strain, we also see an initial stepwise 
reduction in the hospital incidence of new patient acquisitions 
(Figure 3). However, the drop is smaller than for the resistant strain 
because the sensitive strain depends much less on hospital trans-
mission for maintaining its hospital prevalence and much more on 
importations from the community. Despite this initial fall in hospi-
tal prevalence and incidence of the sensitive strain, over a period of 
several years there are modest increases in both - a consequence of 
reduced competition with the resistant strain. The net result is that 
the intervention has a discordant effect on new hospital acquisi-
tions of the sensitive and resistance strains; the former marginally 
increases over a period of several years, while the latter declines to 
low levels.
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Figure 3. Predicted incidence and prevalence trends of the sensitive and resistant bacterial strains following the introduction of 
enhanced infection control. Trends in the incidence of new acquisitions (symptomatic and asymptomatic) and carriage prevalence for 
resistant and sensitive bacterial strains following a 10% stepwise improvement in hand hygiene compliance after one year from a baseline 
of 40%. As prevalence in the hospital represents only a small fraction of the overall prevalence (in hospital and community populations 
combined), the latter is almost identical to the community prevalence for both the resistant and sensitive bacterial strains.
Broadly similar dynamics were observed for larger increases in 
hand hygiene compliance, and for sufficiently high compliance the 
intervention was capable of driving the resistant strain to extinc-
tion (Supplementary material). Thus, while the resistant strain 
was able to persist at a low level alongside the sensitive strain 
when hand hygiene compliance was 50% (Figure 3), increasing it 
further to >55% induced a more rapid decline in both the 
hospital and community reservoir and successfully eliminated 
the resistant strain (Supplementary Figure S1 and Supplementary 
Figure S2).
Importance of the degree of strain adaptation to the 
hospital and community settings
With baseline parameters, 25% of acquisitions of the resistant 
strain occurred in hospital; the corresponding figure for the sensi-
tive strain was 2.5%. Increasing adaptation of the resistant strain to 
the hospital environment (i.e. increasing the proportion of resistant 
transmission that occurs in hospital while keeping the basic repro-
duction number constant), resulted in larger effect sizes for the 
hospital infection control intervention: 0.1 ≤ IRR ≤ 0.6 for inci-
dence linked to hospital transmission and 0.2 ≤ IRR ≤ 0.9 for 
incidence related to community transmission (Figure 4). For the 
sensitive strain, secondary cases with a hospital link also 
declined in response to the intervention, though at lower rates 
than the resistant strain (0.6 ≤ IRR ≤ 0.9).
In contrast, incidence rates of the sensitive pathogen without a 
hospital link either remained unchanged or increased following 
the infection control intervention (0.9 ≤ IRR ≤ 1.2). The smaller 
the importance of the hospital environment for transmission of the 
sensitive strain, the larger the increase in its incidence rate in the 
community in response to the intervention (Figure 4). This increase 
became larger when the percentage of resistance strain acquisitions 
occurring in the community increased.
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Figure 4. Annual incidence rate ratios associated with an infection control intervention under different levels of adaptation of sensitive 
and resistant strains to hospital and community settings. In all simulations, basic reproduction number for resistant and sensitive strains 
were held constant at 1.5 and 1.4, respectively. White spaces represent scenarios where no co-existence occurred. An IRR = 1 corresponds 
to no change.
Discussion
Our analysis shows that discordant temporal changes in resistant 
and sensitive infections in response to intensified hospital-based 
control measures, as observed for Staphylococcus aureus2,3 and 
C. difficile4, are consistent with an intervention that reduces trans-
mission rates of resistant and sensitive bacteria equally. Under 
plausible assumptions (all of which have been used in previous 
models5,6,12,13) our simulations were able to produce effect sizes that 
are similar to those observed with real data4. Notably, we did not 
assume the existence of an intervention, such as antimicrobial stew-
ardship, that has different direct effects on resistant and sensitive 
strains. Some aspects of our results (and of the real-world data) may 
be considered counterintuitive3,4, but the modelling framework helps 
provide a simple intuitive explanation. In general, if two pathogen 
strains compete unequally in two environments, a transmission-
reducing intervention that preferentially targets one environment 
will have a disproportionate effect on the strain better adapted to 
that environment. We have used a hand hygiene intervention as our 
motivating example; similar conclusions would have been reached 
with other nonspecific hospital infection control measures, such as 
ward cleaning.
Previous modelling work has shown that hospital infection control 
measures can have a greater effect on resistant than on sensitive 
bacteria12. This can be expected when the hospital influx of patients 
carrying sensitive bacteria is the dominant factor in maintaining 
their high hospital prevalence, while patient-to-patient spread is 
largely responsible for the high hospital prevalence of resistant bac-
teria. Our model has extended this work by explicitly accounting 
for transmission in the community reservoir. One motivation for 
doing this is to allow direct comparison with data from recent stud-
ies using whole genome sequencing to identify infections plausibly 
linked to recent hospital transmission4. Consideration of hospital 
and community dynamics also enabled us to capture the observed 
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long-term temporal changes in resistance in response to interven-
tions, and to demonstrate that the prevalence of sensitive bacteria 
may in fact marginally increase following non-specific infection 
control measures. We have not attempted to quantify the relative 
contributions of infection control, antibiotic stewardship and other 
factors in the large reductions in nosocomial infections with C. 
difficile and S. aureus in England and Wales. Our analysis merely 
shows that the observed reductions in resistant infections without 
reductions in sensitive infections is not inconsistent with infection 
control playing a major role. There are other lines of evidence to 
suggest infection control may have made an important contribu-
tion. For example, in England and Wales strong negative associa-
tions between hospital-level usage of soap and C. difficile infection 
rates and between alcohol hand rub and MRSA infection rates have 
been reported1. Similar associations have been reported elsewhere 
(e.g. 14).
The intensification of hospital infection control is commonly mul-
tifaceted, complicating the quantification of the effectiveness of 
individual interventions. Our findings indicate further data, e.g. 
hospital-level antimicrobial consumption data and measures of the 
behavioural impact of infection control interventions, are required 
to more reliably quantify the relative contribution of different 
control measures to the reductions observed. The most detailed 
analysis to date comes from two long time series studies from 
northeast Scotland15,16. These suggest that both antibiotic steward-
ship and infection control measures made important contributions 
to the decline in MRSA infections in this region, while an antibiotic 
stewardship intervention (restricting the use of fluoroquinolones, 
clindamycin, co-amoxiclav, and cephalosporins) was likely to have 
been the dominant factor in reducing C. difficile infections. A strong 
point of our work is the simple framework we used for considering 
generic pathogens. The flexibility of the model readily allows adap-
tation to specific pathogens. For example, assumptions about car-
riage duration and the degree of bacterial interference between the 
two strains can easily be altered. In addition, by capturing dynamic 
transmission in both hospital- and community-populations (some-
thing commonly ignored in mathematical models of nosocomial 
pathogens17), and including a core group of recently discharged 
patients with higher readmission rates, we were able to capture the 
interaction between hospital and community more realistically. Of 
note, this core group is not an essential model requirement for our 
central result, which is that infection control interventions alone 
can account for the very different effects on sensitive and resistant 
strains.
Our work also has important limitations. All models are 
simplifications of reality. Hospitals and communities encompass 
complex networks of contact patterns; our model represents only 
a caricature of these networks. We did not allow for co-infection 
with resistant and sensitive strains. This is a reasonable approxi-
mation for S. aureus9, and competition for ecological niches 
has been reported for C. difficile (e.g. 18,19), but it is unclear 
how appropriate this assumption would be for other enteric 
pathogens. Clearly, our model also ignores a lot of host and pathogen 
heterogeneity. However, we can think of no plausible mechanism 
by which incorporation of more biological realism would in any 
way alter our primary conclusion. Though our framework allows 
for further complexity, the purpose here was to demonstrate that the 
divergent effects of infection control interventions on resistant and 
sensitive models could be explained even with a simple model. 
Therefore, no formal model fitting to data was conducted. How-
ever, we have presented a set of scenarios for different degrees of 
hospital-adaptation, making our findings generalizable to a wide 
variety of settings and pathogens.
Conclusions
Hospital-based infection control interventions, such as hand 
hygiene, that target sensitive and resistant bacteria equally, can 
result in diverging outcomes for strains which are differentially 
adapted to community and hospital transmission. While it is highly 
plausible that changing patterns of antibiotic usage have played an 
important role in some of the observed declines in C. difficile and 
S. aureus infections, the relative importance of antibiotic steward-
ship versus infection control interventions cannot be inferred from 
differential changes in infection rates with resistant and sensitive 
bacteria.
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Supplementary material
Figure S1: Predicted trends in incidence of new acquisitions of sensitive and resistant strains under varying improvements in hand 
hygiene compliance. Trends in the incidence of new acquisitions (symptomatic and asymptomatic) for resistant and sensitive bacterial 
strains following a 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% improvement in hand hygiene compliance from a baseline of 40%.
Click here to access the data 
Figure S2: Predicted trends in prevalence of new acquisitions of sensitive and resistant strains under varying improvements in hand 
hygiene compliance. Trends in the prevalence of carriage (symptomatic and asymptomatic) for resistant and sensitive bacterial strains fol-
lowing a 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% improvement in hand hygiene compliance from a baseline of 40%. 
Click here to access the data
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This is over the 5-year period modelled, as presented in Figure S1 and Figure S2. The
lower the improvement in hand hygiene, the more gradual the decline in resistant
bacteria. Running the model over a 10-year period shows that eventually elimination of
the resistant strain will be reached under 50% hand hygiene compliance as well. However,
we considered a 5-year time horizon sufficient to illustrate the underlying dynamics. We
have added the following text to the result section:
 
“…increasing it further to 55% induced a more rapid decline in both the hospital and community








With smaller population sizes (and smaller hospitals), stochastic effects would become
increasingly important and the relative magnitude of fluctuations in each hospital would
increase (in proportion to the reciprocal of the square root of the population size).  Such
stochastic effects are not accounted for in our paper as the key intention was to shed light
on how hospital interventions could lead to long-term trends in large populations.
Stochastic models would lead to the same broad conclusions, but in any given simulation
the trends might be obscured by stochastic fluctuations (particularly when populations
are small).  We have added the following sentence listed in bold to the discussion:
 
Our model also ignores a lot of host and pathogen heterogeneity, and we did not account for
0
1
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 Our model also ignores a lot of host and pathogen heterogeneity, and we did not account for
stochastic effects. In small populations of single hospitals, chance events are likely to
However, we can think ofplay an important role in the transmission dynamics of pathogens. 
no plausible mechanism by which incorporation of more biological realism would in any way alter
our primary conclusion. Though our framework allows for further complexity, the purpose here was
to demonstrate that the divergent effects of infection control interventions on resistant and





The EU FP7 framework RN4cast study surveyed practicing nurses in nine European
countries in 2012, and hence provided insight in acute Trust nursing staff ratios in these
[1,2]countries, including England . For England, ~3000 nurses from 31 Trusts, 46 hospitals
participated in the study. Patient to nursing staff ratios were highly variable across the
sampled Trusts in England, with an overall average of per 1 one patient, 8.8 [Range: 5.5 –
[2]11.5] registered nurses . Moreover, levels of 1:8 were found during day time and 1:11
[1]during night time on average . Across all participating countries, the patient-to-nurse
[2]ratio was 1:8.3 [2.4 – 17.9] . We are aware that these figures include nurses only, while
not accounting for other healthcare workers. As nurses account for the largest fraction of
caring staff, we believe that our patient healthcare worker ratio of 1:10 is not unrealistic.
However, we wish to emphasise that lower patient-to-healthcare worker ratios would not
change our findings. 
 




Fundamentally, we have presented a model of carriage dynamics and the assumption is
that clinical infections increase in line with the number of carriers.  The key results
presented do not depend on the proportion of colonized patients who develop an
infection. For example, in figure 3, incidence refers to the "incidence of new acquisitions
(symptomatic and asymptomatic) " and figure 4 also refers to changes in incidence of
acquisitions of both symptomatic and asymptomatic infection (apologies if this was not
clear). The exception is figure 2 where we are attempting to simulate something like the
incidence data we observe (i.e. samples submitted to the Oxford University Hospitals NHS
Trust that tested positive for This hospital does all the testing inC. difficile. C. difficile 
Oxfordshire, including samples submitted by GPs, community hospitals and other
[3]providers ), though in this case we report only changes in these incidence rates
associated with an intervention (i.e. incidence rate ratios) rather than absolute numbers to
aid comparison with reference 4.  The net result is the expected values of these IRRs will
be insensitive to the risk of clinical infection given carriage in hospital and community,
but the absolute numbers (and therefore degree of dispersion) will be sensitive to this. We
agree that difference in case mix between hospitalised individuals and individuals
residing in the community might lead to a difference in likelihood of developing infection.
In addition, hospital-acquired cases are probably more likely to be reportedC. difficile 
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 In addition, hospital-acquired cases are probably more likely to be reportedC. difficile 
than community-acquired cases.  Indeed, this may explain why the simulations are giving
wider dispersion for the IRR for hospital linked cases than observed data but somewhat
narrower dispersion for the community linked cases (for which we may be overestimating
the proportion seen in hospital). To address this issue we allowed for different constants
of proportionality for hospital and community-linked infections, and, by default, assumed
that hospital-acquired cases were 5 times more likely to be reported as
community-acquired cases. Figure 2 has been updated accordingly.
 
In addition, the method section now reads:
 
“We assumed the number of new infections reported with a hospital link or a community was
proportional to the cumulative number of acquisitions in the hospital community in each of theor 
two time periods”
 
In explaining our calculated observed infections we now say:
 
“…and assuming 1 in 10 carriage episodes acquired in hospital resulted in a reported
infection. This was 1 in 50 for community-acquired episodes. Hence we allowed for
differences in reporting rates in both settings as well as heterogeneity in case-mix
affecting the likelihood of developing an infection.”
 
Moreover, we have changed the caption of Figure 4 in line with figure 3, the caption now
reads:
 
“Annual incidence rate ratios of new acquisitions (symptomatic and asymptomatic)
associated with an infection control intervention under different levels of adaptation of
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We recognise that both types of carriage have been found among healthcare
[4]workers, at least in the case of MRSA. A review of the literature  revealed a wide
array of studies with some finding persistent carriage to be more common, whereas
other studies concluded transient carriage is the most frequent type of carriage
among healthcare workers. The findings of these studies are likely to be setting
[4]dependent and, as concluded by Albrich and Harbarth , sensitive to
misclassification bias (e.g. incorrectly defining transient carriage as persistent
carriage), and are, in any case, not informative about the significance of longer-term
staff carriage for hospital transmission dynamics. In this model, we assumed that
persistent carriage by healthcare workers does not play a significant role in
hospital transmission and can be neglected. Clearly, as with other model
assumptions, this is a simplification, and we acknowledge that there are case
reports of outbreaks with a plausible link to long-term staff carriers. However, our
assumption is supported by a prospective carriage study of MRSA in adult and
paediatric ICUs using whole genome sequencing to determine possible
[5]transmission pathways . This study showed frequent patient acquisition events of
MRSA with closely related strains shared between overlapping patients, strongly
suggesting patient-to-patient transmission. In contrast, while MRSA was recovered
from nasal swabs from four healthcare workers, there was only a single patient
MRSA acquisition that could have been plausibly related to known staff carriage
(based on the whole genome sequencing data). Since patients were not mobile,
patient-to-patient transmission events are likely to represent either hand-borne or
air-borne transmission. Studies from the 1960s suggest that the latter plays a
relatively minor role in  transmission in hospital settings (see, forS. aureus
[6,7]example, ). Since the purpose of our model is to illustrate the potential
differential effects of infection control measures on sensitive and resistant strains
(and not to make strong claims for potential impact of different control measures),
for simplicity we chose to focus on what appears to be the dominant mode of
transmission (at least for , other organisms are less well studied) ratherS. aureus
than adding non-essential complexity by accounting for other transmission
pathways.  Therefore, following hand hygiene, healthcare worker carriage is cleared
and new contact with contaminated patients is required for healthcare workers to
become carriers again. Persistent colonization such as the nasal colonization the
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become carriers again. Persistent colonization such as the nasal colonization the
reviewer is referring to is not included in this model. Hence no explicit colonization
time for healthcare workers is assumed. We have now added the following sentence
to our methods:
“Persistent carriage of bacteria such as MRSA has been reported among healthcare
workers, though is commonly found to be transient”. Followed by the text already
present: “Therefore, healthcare workers in turn were assumed to become
transiently contaminated through patient contact. Hand hygiene performed by a
contaminated healthcare worker was assumed to clear this contamination”
In addition, we have added the following text to our discussion:
Moreover, for simplicity we chose to focus on what appears to be the dominant
mode of transmission (at least for S. aureus, other organisms are less well studied).
Since hospitalised patients are generally not mobile, patient-to-patient transmission
events represent either hand-borne or air-borne transmission. Studies from the
1960s suggest that the latter plays a relatively minor role in S. aureus transmission












We thank the author for spotting this error, the last column should indeed
depict the rates for tau, gammaR and gammaS. We have now changed the
values to reflect the reciprocal duration. 
 




We belief 400 days of carriage is a plausible value to represent the dynamics
of MRSA. For example, Scanvic et al, CID 2001 found a median duration of
carriage of 8.5 months among patients readmitted to hospital, following an
exponential distribution[8]. This would result in an average duration of: y  =
(8.5/12)*365*1/log(2) = 373 days.
For other major pathogens this is less well known, but, in the case of for
example likely to be shorter. Our key results however, are notC. difficile, 
[9]affected by this; in Van Kleef et al LID 2017  we show an example where we
assumed a shorter duration of carriage (200 days) and were able to produce
similar findings and conclusions. We feel that presenting additional
sensitivity analysis here would make the paper harder to read and potentially
in
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sensitivity analysis here would make the paper harder to read and potentially
obscure the key message.
 However, we have added a reference to our analysis using different
[9]parameter values, including a shorter duration of carriage  to the
discussion:
“For example, assumptions about carriage duration, mixing of community
populations, and the degree of bacterial interference between the two strains
can easily be altered (and will not change our main conclusions, as shown in
respectively [20], Figure S3, Figure S4)”Furthermore, we added the reference
of Scanvic et al to table 2.
 
The rational behind the different transmission probabilities of patients and
healthcare workers relates to our assumption explained under comment 1.
We assume that healthcare workers were transiently hand-carriers of
bacterial pathogens, whereas patients were fully colonised. For patients, this
could be e.g. on the skin, wounds or nasal carriage. We translated these
different degrees of carriage in different risks of transmission. We fully agree
with the reviewer that a justified value for based on scientific evidencep 
would be important if we were interested in quantifying effects of hand
hygiene interventions specifically. However, we are just using hand hygiene
as a specific example of an intervention that interrupts transmission in the
 hospital but not the community for resistant and sensitive strains equally. To
make the latter clearer, we have added the following in bold to our
introduction:
“We explicitly model a hospital hand hygiene intervention as an example of a
and evaluate the impact of thisnon-specific infection control measure 
intervention on the incidence of hospital and community acquisitions of










e apologies that we did not make our assumptions regarding bacterial inference
clear in our manuscript. We do assume competition for colonization between
strains. This is specified by the parameters w  and w  (see table 2) which by default
were set to 0 (implying carriage of one strain completely blocks acquisition of
another i.e. complete bacterial interference). In response to this comment we have
now conducted an additional sensitivity analysis where we assume w ,w  = 0.25,
0.5, 0.75 and 1 respectively. The results are presented in Figure S3.
   We find that at lower levels of bacterial interference (i.e. higher ω and ω ), the
s r
S R
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 3.  
4.  
   We find that at lower levels of bacterial interference (i.e. higher ω and ω ), the
incidence of the resistant strain in both the hospital and the community is higher
compared to baseline, whereas the incidence of the sensitive strain is lower in both
settings (Figure S3). This relates to the higher R of the resistant strain, giving it a
competitive advantage over the sensitive strain, which is further enhanced when
replacement infection is allowed for. At w ,w  = 1, this means the sensitive strain
does not coexist with the resistant at baseline hand hygiene levels of 40%.
However, after implementation of the hand hygiene intervention, the sensitive strain
will emerge even under these conditions. Thus, what is shown is that regardless of
the level of bacterial interference, the overall conclusions remain unchanged:
hospital infection control can have discordant effects on resistant and sensitive
bacteria provided heterogeneity is present in their respective environmental
adaptations.
Just to clarify, while we do consider competition we do not consider superinfection
[10](i.e. co-infection with both sensitive and resistant strains ) and we state this in
the methods section “Individuals could not be co-infected with resistant and
Including this would greatly add to the complexity of the model,sensitive strains”. 
reduce readability and, we feel, obscure the key messages.
We have added the following text in bold to the discussion section:
“For example, assumptions about carriage duration and the degree of bacterial interference
between the two strains can easily be altered (and will not change our main
conclusions, Lancet ID paper, Figure S3, Figure S4)”
Moreover, we have added the term ‘replacement infection’ to our methods, which
now reads:
“we allowed for bacterial interference between the two strains so that colonization










We varied the values of beta_R  (where n = population 1, population 2, population
 3) to give values of R0 = 1.5 an beta_R to give values of R0 = 1.4 keeping all other
parameter values constant and ran the model at equilibrium. If at model equilibrium,
the strain adaptation to each of the respective environments was at the desirable
level, these values were chosen for model parameterisation. Here, the degree of
strain adaptation was defined as the fraction of new acquisitions of strain i
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 4.  
5.  
The corresponding values for all beta_i used to produce figure 4 are available at 
. We have addedhttps://github.com/esthervankleef/Two_strain_model_published
the following text in bold to the method section:
“Increasing adaptation of the resistant strain to the hospital environment (i.e. increasing the
proportion of resistant transmission that occurs in hospital by changing the values of the
while keeping the basic reproduction numbertransmission parameters (beta_i )  and all
other parameters constant),
Also, we added the following text to the legend of Figure 4.







The reason why the denominator for hcw  and hcw  derivatives is N  follows
from the structure of our model, which assumes healthcare workers are the
[11]pathogen vectors.  Similar to Cooper et al (1999)  we assume that in hospital, all
transmission events between patients is caused by a contact from a transiently
colonized HCW. Similarly, HCW acquire transient hand-contamination only by
touching colonized patients.
In our model, beta_R = the probability that an uncolonized patient becomes
colonized on contact with a colonized healthcare worker, whereas p*beta_R = the
probability that an uncolonized healthcare worker becomes colonized with a
resistant strain on contact with a colonized patient (where rho = ratio of probability
of patient-to-HCW transmission vs HCW-to-patient transmission).
Hence, the rates at which contacts are made which can potentially result in
 colonization with a resistant strain is beta_R *U for patients (i.e. a function of
beta_R and the number of uncolonized patients U ), and p*beta_R *R for
 healthcare workers (i.e. a function of p beta_R and, the number of colonized
patients R ). Only a fraction of these contacts will result in transmission. For
patients this is the fraction of contacts which are with colonized healthcare workers
(hcw- /N )  For healthcare workers, it is those contacts in which the healthcare
worker is uncolonized that will result in transmission (N – hcw hcw )/ N ).
As a result, the rate of colonization for patients and healthcare workers is
beta_R1*U *hcw /N  and p*beta_R *R (N  – hcw  – hcw )/N respectively.
In the community we do assume direct transmission between individuals, hence











hcw R – s hcw
1 R hcw 1 1 hcw R s hcw 
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 5.  
6.  
here the population size of the susceptible hosts is used as a denominator while
[12]following the assumption of frequency dependent transmission of Otto and Day ,
further explained under comment 6.













This is a good point. We recognize that our baseline assumptions regarding the
 mixing of our population need further clarification. In our description of the force of
infection, we followed the definition of Otto and Day, who decompose the frequency
dependent incidence rate, i.e. the rate at which new infections occur, in three
[12]components :
The rate of contact with other individuals in the population ( ) which are of anc
appropriate type for transmission to be possible if one of the hosts is infectious
The probability that the contact is indeed with a susceptible host U ( assumed top, 
be U(t)/N(t))
The probability that a contact between an infectious and susceptible host leads to
successful transmission ( )v
In the case of frequency dependent transmission, c is assumed constant, hence the
effective contact rate or transmission coefficient beta = cv. Assuming frequency
dependent transmission, and the definition of Otto and Day, the mixing matrix for
the community population should be as follows, where the beta terms are
equivalent to the effective contact rates, and e.g. f /beta_R  reflects that the
effective contact rate between individuals of population 2 and population 3 is a
fraction of the effective contact rate between individuals in population 3.
Equation 1
Multiplying these by the number of infected individuals in each population and the
probability that the contact is indeed with a susceptible host (U /N ) wouldp  
result in the following incidence rates:
Equation 2
As our lambdas represent the force of infections, i.e. the rate at which a susceptible
23 3
i Ri i
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 6.  
As our lambdas represent the force of infections, i.e. the rate at which a susceptible
individual becomes infected, we replaced p of the incidence rates with the
    probability that the contact is with one specific susceptible host, i.e. and , resulting
in:
Equation 3
 The same logic applies to lambda_S and lambda_S
We realise our description of the f  and f  in table 2 was not entirely correct and
would be better described as given below. Moreover, the reference of our frequency
dependent transmission has been added to the method section, which now reads:
“We assumed frequency-dependent transmission [10]. The model allowed for the
possibility of assortative mixing within populations 2 and 3, where the effective
contact rate of strain i (beta_in) between individuals within a population is a fraction
of the effective contact rate between individuals across populations: “
Equation 4
We have changed the description of f  and f  in Table 2 to:
f23 = The ratio of the effective contact rate in N2 from someone in N3 to the
effective contact rate in N3 from someone in N3 (where 1 implies that on contact,
someone in N3 is causing new infections in N3 and N2 at the same rate. Of note, as
N3 > N2, f23 = N2/N3 assumes the same per capita infection rate, i.e. homogenous
mixing.
f32 = The ratio of the effective contact rate in N3 from someone in N2 to the
successful contact rate in N2 from someone in N2 (where 1 implies that on contact,
someone in N2 is causing new infections in N2 and N3 at the same rate. Of note, as
N3 > N2, f32 = N3/N2 assumes the same per capita infection rate, i.e. homogenous
mixing.
With regards to our assortative mixing assumption, as described in the above
definitions, by defining f23 = N2/N3 and f32 = 1, we assume that individuals in N3
are equally likely to infect an individual in N2 as they are to infect a given individual
in N3, whereas setting f32 to 1 implies a higher per capita rate of infection in N2,
given N2 < N3, thus individuals in N2 are more likely to infect an individual in N2
than an individual in N3.   Baseline values of these parameters were chosen to
reflect perceived heterogeneities in contacts (e.g. assuming a scenario of LTCFs
(N2) vs the general population (N3) where those in N2 will be exposed preferentially
to those in N2, but, considering some in N3 will be carers to N2, N3 will mix equally
 with N2 and N3. These assumptions are not critical to our results, as shown by a
sensitivity analysis, where we modelled the following additional scenarios:
Fully homogenous mixing (f23 = N2/N3, f32 = N3/N2)
Fully assortative mixing (f23= f32=0) 
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The results of this analysis are presented in Figure S4. We have added the following
text to the discussion section:
“For example, assumptions about carriage duration and the degree of bacterial interference
between the two strains can easily be altered (and will not change our main




The annual incidence ratio represents the ratio of the number of new infection in the
year pre-intervention (T ) to the number of new cases in the first year
post-intervention (T- ). As mentioned in the method section, Y represents the
actual number of observed infections of strain i in population n, which is
proportional to the cumulative number of acquisitions in each population in these
two time periods.
We have now changed the methods section ‘measuring the impact of hospital
infection control’ to the following:
“Annual incidence rate ratios (IRR) were calculated using simulated data for one
year pre- and post-intervention (T  and T  respectively) after first running the model
to equilibrium. To aid comparison with reported infection data, we assumed the
number of new infections (Y ) with and without a hospital link was proportional to
the cumulative number of acquisitions (I ) in the hospital and community,
respectively, in each of the two time periods:
Equation 5
Confidence intervals were calculated using 1000 Monte Carlo replicates on the
assumption that the actual number of observed infections of each strain (Y )
followed a negative binomial distribution where Var(Y ) = µ+ µ /k, with k (the
dispersion parameter) = µ/( - 1), with  = 5, and assuming 1 in 10 carriage episodes
acquired in hospital resulted in a reported infection. This was 1 in 50 for
community-acquired episodes. Hence we allowed for differences in reporting rates
in both settings as well as heterogeneity in case-mix affecting the likelihood of
developing an infection. Then the IRR  corresponded to the ratio of the number of
new observed infections of strain i in population n in the year pre-intervention to the
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We fully agree that it is helpful to show where the transmission events are actually
occurring and this is what we are depicting in the top row of figure 3 - i.e.
community-to-community transmission (dashed line) and hospital-to-hospital
transmission (dotted line). The model assumes that community-to-hospital and
hospital-to-community transmission events do not occur (we do not depict
importation events of colonized patients to the hospital as these simply scale with
community prevalence and would provide no new information). We apologies that
:the caption to figure 3 did not make this clear and we have now revised it
“Trends in the incidence of new acquisitions (symptomatic and asymptomatic) and carriage
prevalence for resistant and sensitive bacterial strains following a 10% stepwise
improvement in hand hygiene compliance after one year from a baseline of 40%. Incidence
trends are depicted as transmission events following from
community-to-community transmission (dashed line) and hospital-to-hospital
transmission (dotted line). As prevalence in the hospital represents only a small fraction
of the overall prevalence (in hospital and community populations combined), the latter is














In our model and the manuscript through out, R0 is considered the expected
number of secondary cases in the hospital and community resulting from one
colonised individual in a fully uncolonized and susceptible population at baseline
hand hygiene rates of 40%, accounting for the possibility of readmissions while still
colonized. The text in Table 2 has now been altered to reflect colonisation instead
of infection. Moreover, we have altered R0 has now been changed to R  (the net




Many thanks for this sharp observation. We have now updated figure 1, which now
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